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Using Utilitarian and Rawlsian Policies to Attract the 
Creative Class: A Tale of Two Cities 
Abstract 
Consider an aggregate economy of two cities. We study the impact that the use of 
utilitarian and Rawlsian policies by these two cities has on their ability to attract members of the 
the creative class. We first focus on the case in which both cities adopt utilitarian policies. 
Second, we analyze the case where both cities implement Rawlsian policies. Third, we study the 
case where one city uses a Rawlsian policy but the other city pursues a utilitarian policy. Fourth, 
we compare the policy outcomes in the first and the third cases above and show that if one city 
switches to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective when the other city remains utilitarian, the 
aggregate economy becomes less egalitarian. Finally, we compare the second and the third cases 
above and demonstrate that if one city switches to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective when 
the other city remains Rawlsian, the aggregate economy becomes more egalitarian.  
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1. Introduction 
 The two concepts of the creative class and creative capital are now a standard part of the 
literatures in regional science and urban economics. This state of affairs is largely the result of 
the dramatic success that the urbanist Richard Florida has had in popularizing these two 
concepts. As pointed out by Florida (2002, p. 68), the creative class “consists of people who add 
economic value through their creativity.” This class consists of professionals such as doctors, 
engineers, lawyers, scientists, university professors, and, notably, bohemians such as artists, 
musicians, and sculptors. The distinguishing feature of these people is that they possess creative 
capital which is defined to be the “intrinsically human ability to create new ideas, new 
technologies, new business models, new cultural forms, and whole new industries that really 
[matter]” (Florida, 2005, p. 32).  
 Regional scientists and urban economists ought to pay attention to the activities of the 
creative capital possessing creative class because, according to Florida (2002, 2003, 2014), this 
class gives rise to ideas, information, and technology, outputs that are significant for the 
economic growth of cities and regions. Therefore, cities and regions that want to flourish in this 
age of globalization need to do all they can to attract and retain members of this creative class 
who are, for all intents and purposes, the basic drivers of economic growth and development. 
 Once one accepts Florida’s (2002) assertion that cities seeking to prosper economically 
need to attract members of the creative class, the next logical question is the following: “How are 
cities to do this?” Florida (2002, 2008), Buettner and Janeba (2016) and Batabyal et al. (2018) 
have answered this question by pointing out that cities can utilize local public goods such as 
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cultural amenities, quality schools, and public transit to effectively carry out the “attract” 
function.4  
Three points are now worth emphasizing. First, as pointed out by Florida and King 
(2016), in addition to local public goods, cities can use a variety of other policies to attract the 
creative class. Second, as noted by Peck (2005), Donegan and Lowe (2008), Reese and Sands 
(2008), and Batabyal and Nijkamp (2016), cities---and more generally regions---in which the 
creative class is a dominant part of the overall labor force have often been impacted by 
inequalities of one sort or another. Finally, the preceding two points notwithstanding, to the best 
of our knowledge, there are no theoretical studies of the ways in which alternate policies 
implemented by cities to attract the creative class impacts inequality in the combined economy in 
which these cities are located.5 Given this lacuna in the literature, we focus on an aggregate 
economy consisting of two cities in this paper. Next, we provide the first theoretical analysis of 
the impact of utilitarian and Rawlsian policies by these two cities on their ability to attract the 
creative class and on inequality in the aggregate economy.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates our model of an 
aggregate economy consisting of two cities that is adapted from Caplin and Nalebuff (1992). The 
creative class of interest to us is made up of a heterogeneous group of individuals possessing 
creative capital. Section 3 analyzes the case in which both cities adopt utilitarian policies. 
Section 4 analyzes the case where both cities implement Rawlsian policies. Section 5 studies the 
case where one city uses a Rawlsian policy but the other city pursues a utilitarian policy. Section 
6 compares the policy outcomes in sections 3 and 5 and shows that if one city switches to a 
                                                            
4  
See Audretsch and Belitski (2013) and Batabyal and Beladi (2018) for a discussion of related issues. 
5  
In terms of the subject matter being studied, Batabyal et al. (2018) is the paper that is most closely related to our paper. That said, 
the reader should note that there is no overlap between the specific questions we study and the way in which we study them in the 
present paper and the questions analyzed in Batabyal et al. (2018).  
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Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective when the other city remains utilitarian, the aggregate 
economy becomes less egalitarian. Section 7 compares the policy consequences in sections 4 and 
5 and establishes that if one city switches to a Rawlsian or more egalitarian objective when the 
other city remains Rawlsian, the aggregate economy becomes more egalitarian. Finally, section 8 
concludes and then suggests two ways in which the research described in this paper might be 
extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework  
Consider an aggregate economy of two cities denoted by ݆ ൌ ܣ, ܤ. Each of these two 
cities competes for members of the creative class with its choice of a particular policy. 
Consistent with the discussion in section 1, we are using the word “policy” in a general way. As 
such, one such policy could be how much to provide of a local public good as in Batabyal et al. 
(2018) and a second policy might be how much funding to make available to creative class 
members wishing to undertake one or more entrepreneurial ventures. The policy choice of city ݆ 
is denoted by a point ݖ௝ on the closed interval ሾ0, 1ሿ.  
Creative class members differ in their preference for alternate policies implemented by 
cities ܣ and ܤ. Specifically, a creative class member of type ߞ who chooses to live in city ݆ with 
policy ݖ௝ obtains utility given by the quadratic function  
෡ܷ൫ݖ௝, ߞ൯ ൌ െ൫ߞ െ ݖ௝൯ଶ.      (1) 
Clearly, equation (1) tells us that a type ߞ creative class member’s preferred policy is ݖ ൌ ߞ. We 
assume that the distribution of the creative class population can be described by a triangular 
probability distribution function on the closed interval ሾ0, 1ሿ. 6 Given the policy choice of each 
city, each creative class member chooses the city with the policy that is closer to his most 
                                                            
6  
See Forbes et al. (2011) for a textbook exposition of the triangular probability distribution function.  
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preferred policy. Finally, the equilibrium of interest to us has two parts to it. First, no city wishes 
to alter its policy given the policy of the other city. Second, no creative class member wishes to 
move given the policy choices of the two cities. With this description of our aggregate economy 
of two cities out of the way, our next task is to analyze the case in which the two cities adopt 
utilitarian policies. 
3. Utilitarian Policies 
 We begin by letting ߞ௜ denote the creative class member who is indifferent between 
living in the two cities given that each city is choosing its policy in accordance with a utilitarian 
criterion. Specifically, this means that city ܣ	ሺܤሻ maximizes the sum of the utilities of the 
creative class members who live in city ܣ	ሺܤሻ. Now, using the symmetry of the distribution of 
the preferences of the creative class members and the symmetry of the city objective function, 
we infer that in the equilibrium, the creative class population will be equally divided between 
cities ܣ and ܤ. This means that ߞ௜ ൌ 1 2.⁄   
The optimal policy choice of the utilitarian city ܣ is given by solving 
 
݉ܽݔ௭ಲ ׬ െሺߞ െ ݖ஺ሻଶଵ ଶ⁄଴ ݂ሺߞሻ݀ߞ,     (2) 
 
where ݂ሺ∙ሻ is the density function. From Forbes et al. (2011, pp. 189-191), the triangular 
probability distribution function is given by  
 
݂ሺߞሻ ൌ ൜ 4ߞ, 0 ൑ ߞ ൑ 1 2⁄4ሺ1 െ ߞሻ, 1 2⁄ ൏ ߞ ൑ 1.     (3) 
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Using equation (3) we can simplify city ܣ′ݏ objective function given in equation (2). This gives 
us 
ܷሺݖ஺ሻ ൌ 4׬ െሺߞ െ ݖ஺ሻଶଵ ଶ⁄଴ ߞ݀ߞ.     (4) 
 
Integrating the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (4), we can rewrite city ܣ′ݏ objective function 
as  
 
ܷሺݖ஺ሻ ൌ ௭ಲଷ െ
௭ಲమ
ଶ െ
ଵ
ଵ଺.      (5) 
 
Differentiating equation (5) with respect to ݖ஺ and then simplifying the resulting 
expression gives us the utilitarian solution for city ܣ. We get  
 
ௗ௎ሺ௭ಲሻ
ௗ௭ಲ ൌ
ଵ
ଷ െ ݖ஺ ൌ 0 ⇒ ݖ஺ ൌ
ଵ
ଷ.     (6) 
 
Now, by symmetry, the utilitarian solution for city ܤ is  
 
ݖ஻ ൌ ଶଷ.        (7) 
 
Our analysis thus far tells us that the creative class member of type ߞ௜ ൌ 1 2⁄  is indeed 
indifferent between residing in city ܣ and city ܤ. In addition, three points are now worth 
emphasizing. First, creative class members with type ߞ ൏ 1 2⁄  will strictly prefer the policy 
choice of city ܣ ሺݖ஺ ൌ 1 3⁄ ሻ and therefore will want to live in city ܣ. Second, creative class 
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members with type ߞ ൐ 1 2⁄  will strictly prefer the policy choice of city ܤ ሺݖ஻ ൌ 2 3⁄ ሻ and 
hence will want to live in city ܤ. Finally, the creative class population divides equally between 
the two cities ܣ and ܤ. We now proceed to analyze the case in which the two cities adopt 
Rawlsian policies.  
4. Rawlsian Policies 
 In contrast to the utilitarian policies studied in section 3, when city ܣ	ሺܤሻ adopts a 
Rawlsian policy, it maximizes the minimum utility of the creative class members who are 
resident in city ܣ	ሺܤሻ. Let ݖ denote the creative class member who is indifferent between living 
in the two cities. Then, we claim that city ܣ will choose a policy that is at the midpoint of the 
closed interval ሾ0, ݖሿ which gives us ݖ 2⁄ .  
To establish the claim in the preceding paragraph, we proceed with a proof by 
contradiction. To this end, suppose that the above claim is false. Then if city ܣ′ݏ policy is to the 
left of the midpoint then the creative class member of type ݖ will be the worst-off individual in 
city ܣ and it will be possible to raise his utility by moving city ܣᇱݏ policy to the right, that is, 
closer to the midpoint. Considering the other possibility, if city ܣ′ݏ policy is to the right of the 
midpoint then the creative class member of type ߞ ൌ 0 will be the worst-off individual in this 
city. In this last case, it will be possible to raise this “worst-off” creative class member’s utility 
by moving city ܣ′ݏ policy to the left, that is, closer to the midpoint. By an analogous line of 
reasoning, it follows that the Rawlsian city ܤ will choose a policy that is at the midpoint of the 
closed interval ሾݖ, 1ሿ which gives us ሺ1 ൅ ݖሻ 2.⁄   
As a result of the policy choices by cities ܣ and ܤ described in the preceding paragraph, 
the creative class member who is indifferent between living in cities ܣ and ܤ is given by ݖ ൌ
1 2⁄ . We are now in a position to use ݖ ൌ 1 2⁄  to draw two conclusions. First, the actual policy 
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choice of city ܣ is ݖ஺ ൌ 1 4⁄  and that of city ܤ is ݖ஻ ൌ 3 4.⁄  Second, the creative class population 
is equally divided between the two cities.  
It is useful to point out exactly how the adoption of Rawlsian or egalitarian policies by 
the two cities differs from the case in which they pursue utilitarian policies. In the Rawlsian case, 
the two cities choose policies that are at the midpoint of the preferences of the creative class 
members who choose to live in these two cities. As shown in figure 1, this gives us the numerical 
Figure 1 about here 
policy choices of ݖ஺ ൌ 1 4,⁄  ݖ஻ ൌ 3 4,⁄  and the letter “R” denotes Rawlsian. In contrast, when 
the two cities pursue utilitarian policies, they choose policies that are at the center of gravity of 
the preferences of the creative class members who live in these same two cities. Figure 1 shows 
that this gives us the numerical policy choices of ݖ஺ ൌ 1 3,⁄  ݖ஻ ൌ 2 3,⁄  and the letter “U” denotes 
utilitarian. Note that because we have chosen to delineate the distribution of the creative class 
population with the triangular probability distribution function, the distance between the optimal 
policy choices in the utilitarian case (2 3⁄ െ 1 3 ൌ 1 3⁄⁄ ሻ is smaller than the corresponding 
distance in the Rawlsian case (3 4⁄ െ 1 4 ൌ 1 2ሻ⁄⁄ . Let us now proceed to analyze the case where 
one city uses a Rawlsian policy but the other city pursues a utilitarian policy. 
5. Rawlsian and Utilitarian Policies 
 Without loss of generality, suppose that city ܣ uses a Rawlsian policy and that city ܤ 
pursues a utilitarian policy. We claim that ݖ ൌ 2 5⁄  represents the creative class member who is 
now indifferent between living in the two cities under study. From the analysis in section 4, we 
know that city ܣ chooses a policy that is at the midpoint of the closed interval ሾ0, 2 5ሿ.⁄  
Similarly, the section 3 analysis tells us that city ܤ chooses a policy that is at the center of 
10 
 
gravity of the closed interval ሾ2 5⁄ , 1ሿ. With this information, we infer that the Rawlsian city ܣ 
chooses a policy at 1 5⁄ .  
 To ascertain the center of gravity of the preferences of the creative class members in city 
ܤ, we solve  
 
݉ܽݔ௭ಳܷሺݖ஻ሻ ൌ ׬ െሺߞ െ ݖ஻ሻଶଵଶ ହ⁄ ݂ሺߞሻ݀ߞ,    (8) 
 
subject to the creative class population distribution function given by equation (3). Using 
equation (3), city ܤ′ݏ objective function given in equation (8) can be rewritten as 
 
ܷሺݖ஻ሻ ൌ 4׬ െሺߞ െ ݖ஻ሻଶଵ ଶ⁄ଶ ହ⁄ ߞ݀ߞ ൅ 4׬ െሺߞ െ ݖ஻ሻଶ
ଵ
ଵ ଶ⁄ ሺ1 െ ߞሻ݀ߞ.   (9) 
 
Integrating and then simplifying the two expressions on the RHS of equation (9), we get 
ܷሺݖ஻ሻ ൌ 0.8288ݖ஻ െ 0.68ݖ஻ଶ െ 0.2656.    (10) 
Differentiating equation (10) with respect to ݖ஻ and then simplifying the resulting expression 
gives us the utilitarian solution for city ܤ. We get  
 
ௗ௎ሺ௭ಳሻ
ௗ௭ಳ ൌ 0.8288 െ 1.36ݖ஻ ൌ 0 ⇒ ݖ஻ ≅ 0.6.   (11) 
 
We now need to confirm that our initial claim that ݖ ൌ 2 5⁄  represents the creative class 
member who is indifferent between living in cities ܣ and ܤ is valid. To do so, we need to show 
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that the creative class member of type ݖ ൌ 2 5⁄  is indifferent between city ܣ′ݏ policy ݖ஺ ൌ 0.2 
and city ܤ′ݏ policy ݖ஻ ൌ 0.6. Using the utility function given in equation (1), we get 
෡ܷሺݖ஺, ߞሻ ൌ ෡ܷሺݖ஻, ߞሻ ⇔ ሺߞ െ ݖ஺ሻଶ ൌ ሺߞ െ ݖ஻ሻଶ ⇔  
ሺߞ െ 0.2ሻଶ ൌ ሺߞ െ 0.6ሻଶ ⇔ ߞ ൌ 0.4.    (12) 
Equation (12) tells us that the Rawlsian city ܣ′ݏ policy and the utilitarian city ܤ′ݏ policy 
are both equally close to the preferred policy of the creative class member of type ߞ ൌ 0.4 who is 
indifferent between living in these two cities. In addition, all creative class members with type 
ߞ ൏ 0.4 will absolutely prefer to live in city ܣ and all those members with type ߞ ൐ 0.4 will 
absolutely prefer to live in city ܤ. We now compare the policy outcomes in sections 3 and 5 and 
demonstrate that if one city switches to a more Rawlsian or egalitarian objective when the other 
city remains utilitarian, the aggregate economy of the two cities becomes less egalitarian. 
6. Less Egalitarian Aggregate Economy 
 Suppose city ܣ switches from a utilitarian to a Rawlsian objective and city ܤ remains 
utilitarian. Then, from the analysis in sections 3 and 5 we know that the optimal policy choice of 
city ܣ will change from ݖ஺ ൌ 1 3⁄  to ݖ஺ ൌ 0.2. Similarly, the optimal policy choice of city ܤ will 
change from ݖ஻ ൌ 2 3⁄  to ݖ஻ ൌ 0.6. In addition, the utilitarian city ܤ will attract a larger share of 
the total population of creative class members. These points are illustrated in figure 2. 
Figure 2 about here 
 Note that the worst-off creative class member in our aggregate economy is the individual 
with type ߞ ൌ 1. This individual is now confronted with a policy choice that is 0.4	ሺ1 െ 0.6ሻ 
units away from his preferred policy. In contrast, in the pure utilitarian case, this same worst-off 
individual is 0.33 ሺ1 െ 2 3ሻ⁄  units away from his preferred policy. Clearly, since 0.4 ൐ 0.33 our 
aggregate economy becomes less egalitarian when city ܣ switches from a utilitarian to a 
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Rawlsian objective and city ܤ remains utilitarian. On the basis of our analysis thus far in this 
section we conclude that the ability of one city to achieve a more egalitarian policy outcome can 
be thwarted if the other city is not also pursuing the same egalitarian goal. Our final task in this 
paper is to compare the policy consequences in sections 4 and 5 and show that if one city 
switches to a more egalitarian objective when the other city remains Rawlsian, the aggregate 
economy becomes more egalitarian. 
7. More Egalitarian Aggregate Economy 
 Suppose city ܤ switches from a utilitarian goal to a Rawlsian goal and city ܣ remains 
Rawlsian. In this case, our analysis in sections 4 and 5 and in particular figures 1 and 2 tell us 
that the policy choice in city ܤ will change from ݖ஻ ൌ 0.6 to ݖ஻ ൌ 3 4.⁄  Similarly, in city ܣ the 
policy choice will change from ݖ஺ ൌ 0.2 to ݖ஺ ൌ 0.25. In addition, both cities now attract the 
same share of the creative class population. Therefore, the worst-off creative class member in our 
aggregate economy with type ߞ ൌ 1 now observes a policy choice that is 0.25	ሺ1 െ 3 4ሻ⁄  units 
away from his preferred policy choice. In contrast, in the mixed case analyzed in section 5, this 
same individual is 0.4	ሺ1 െ 0.6ሻ units away from his preferred policy. Clearly, since 0.25 ൏ 0.4 
our aggregate economy becomes more egalitarian when city ܤ switches from a utilitarian goal to 
a Rawlsian goal and city ܣ remains Rawlsian.  
In contrast with the main result of section 6, we now see that the ability of one city to 
achieve a more egalitarian policy is enhanced when the other city is also pursuing the same 
egalitarian goal. This completes our analysis of the use of utilitarian and Rawlsian policies by 
cities ܣ and ܤ and the impact that this use has on their ability to attract members of the creative 
class. 
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8. Conclusions  
 In this paper we studied the impact that the use of utilitarian and Rawlsian policies by 
two cities ሺܣ	ܽ݊݀	ܤሻ had on their ability to attract the creative class. We first concentrated on the 
case in which both cities adopted utilitarian policies. Second, we examined the case where both 
cities implemented Rawlsian policies. Third, we studied the case where one city used a Rawlsian 
policy but the other city pursued a utilitarian policy. Fourth, we compared the policy outcomes in 
the first and the third cases and showed that if one city switched to a Rawlsian or more 
egalitarian objective when the other city remained utilitarian, the aggregate economy became 
less egalitarian. Finally, we compared the second and the third cases and demonstrated that if one 
city switched to a more egalitarian objective when the other city remained Rawlsian, the 
aggregate economy became more egalitarian.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what 
follows, we suggest two possible extensions. First, it would be useful to model the interaction 
between the creative class and the two cities as a repeated game in which the players interact 
with each other a finite number of times. Second, it would also be instructive to embed the 
aggregate economy of two cities analyzed here in a probabilistic environment and to then study 
the impact that uncertainty about the preferences of the creative class and/or their ability to 
migrate from one city to the other has on the ability of the two cities under study to attract 
members of the creative class. Studies that analyze these aspects of the underlying problem will 
provide additional insights into the roles that members of the creative class can play in 
augmenting the economic well-being of cities.  
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Figure 1: Utilitarian and Rawlsian policy choices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0                                                                                                                         1 
              0.2                                                        0.6 
               R                                                          U 
Figure 2: Policies leading to a less egalitarian aggregate economy 
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